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SENATE BILL 42 AND THE MYTH OF SHORTENED
SENTENCES FOR CALIFORNIA OFFENDERS:
THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIFORM DETERMINATE
SENTENCING ACT
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time-
To let the punishment fit the crime-
The punishment fit the crime*
Bobbie was sixteen when he was sentenced to a state institution
for joyriding. He was released nine years later.' Another offender,
who had previously served four prison terms, was convicted of
forcible rape at gunpoint, kidnapping, and robbery. Although he
was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence 2 with a maximum term
of life imprisonment, the inmate served a little over a year for his
offenses.
3
This inconsistency is alleviated by California Senate Bill 42, the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976. This Act makes ex-
tensive changes in existing law, affecting over two hundred provi-
sions in the Penal Code.4 The most significant change concerns
* W.S. GILBERT, THE MIKADo 30 (1926).
1. Meyerson, The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles and Indeterminate
Sentencing: A Critique, 51 WASH. L. REv. 617, 622-23 n.27 (1976).
2. [A]n indeterminate sentence is one in which no maximum term is
established, and the appropriate authority has complete power to
release the inmate at any time, with or without conditions, or to
keep him incarcerated for life .... An "indefinite sentence," on
the other hand, is one in which there may be a minimum period
of incarceration, but in any event there is a legislatively or judi-
cially set maximum beyond which the inmate cannot be kept. The
indefiniteness of the sentence arises from the fact that the authority
can release the inmate prior to the expiration of his maximum term.
Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment, 11 AM.
Cnmr. L. REv. 7, 13 n.27 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Prettyman]. Under
former CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970) (repealed 1977), California
came the closest to the original notion of indeterminate sentencing. See
note 16 infra.
3. Meyerson, supra note 1, at 622-23 n.27.
4. See The Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976 Cal. Adv. Legis.
Serv., ch. 1139, 300-01, for a list of the statutes changed by the new law.
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the type of sentence which a convict will now serve. Prior to the
Act, most convicted felons were committed to an indeterminate sen-
tence. Upon entering prison, the felon was subjected to the discre-
tion of the Adult Authority," which decided at what point the
prisoner should be released prior to the expiration of his maximum
sentence. For example, a felon convicted of first degree robbery
under prior law could expect to serve a statutory term of five years
to life imprisonment." The sentence's indeterminacy arose from
the fact that the felon's term could be as short as twenty months,r
or as long as life imprisonment. However, under the new law the
felon will serve a definite8 or fixed term,9 a standardized sentence
which the offender can calculate with reasonable certainty prior
to entering prison.
By eliminating the indeterminate sentence from California law,
Senate Bill 42 raises a number of potential problems.'0 This
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5077 (West 1970) (repealed 1977). Section 3020
provided that "[i]n the case of all persons heretofore or hereafter sentenced
under the provisions of [the indeterminate sentence law], the Adult Au-
thority may determine and redetermine, after the actual commencement of
imprisonment, what length of time, if any, such person shall be imprisoned
.... " The California Women's 'Board of Terms and Parole had similar
jurisdiction over females under 1965 Cal. Stats., ch. 238, § 16 (repealed
1977). For a brief discussion of the Adult Authority and its powers under
the pre-Senate Bill 42 law, see text accompanying notes 19-25 infra.
6. 1923 Cal. Stats., ch. 128, § 1 (repealed 1977).
7. 1947 Cal. Stats., ch. 1381, § 6 (repealed 1977), provided that an
inmate "may be paroled at any time after the expiration of one-third of
the minimum term."
8. "A definite commitment is said to be one fixed by the judge (or jury)
at a term of years which may be less than (but not more than) the maxi-
mum provided by statute for the particular crime." S. RuBIN, LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 157-58 (2d ed. 1973).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1977).
10. For example, the retroactivity potential of Senate Bill 42 was a
highly controversial aspect of the new law. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Dec. 7,
1976, pt. I, at 26, col. 5 (Los Angeles Police Chief Ed Davis claimed that
the unclear retroactivity provisions would cause a mass release of prisoners
on July 1, 1977, the effective date of Senate Bill 42). In response, Senator
John A. Nejedly, an author of the Bill, listed several reasons that the Bill
would not have such a disastrous effect. See Letter from Senator John
A. Nejedly to All Interested Persons Regarding Retroactivity Provisions
of Senate Bill 42, at 1-3 (Sept. 2, 1976) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review). As this article goes to print, the legislature is attempting to
enact Assembly Bill 476, which should resolve the retroactivity problems
associated with Senate Bill 42. This Comment, however, will not address
1177
Comment will briefly review the history of indeterminate sentenc-
ing, sentencing rationale, and the new law. The article will then
address the specific question of whether the new statute will
diminish the amount of time a felon will be required to serve, and
will conclude with an analysis of the Act and its potential effects
on California.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA
History of Indeterminate Sentencing
Prior to 1917, California had a "definite" sentencing system. The
primary purpose of the definite sentence was to ensure the "equal-
ity and certainty of punishment expressed in the establishment of
prescribed sanctions for every crime according to its seriousness.""
Under the early statutory form of commitment, the trial court gen-
erally fixed one term, usually the maximum punishment allowed
under the statute.
12
California enacted its Indeterminate Sentence Law in 1917.13
Founded upon an emerging theory that crime was a "curable sick-
ness," 14 the new statute directed the judiciary to determine the de-
fendant's guilt and impose a legislatively mandated sentence for
his particular violation.' 5 After several revisions, the statutory
scheme remained substantially the same until 1976. Under this law,
neither the court nor the jury specified the length of imprison-
ment."' The court simply sentenced the convict to the term "as
prescribed by law"--a term neither greater than the maximum nor
less than the statutory minimum.17
the issue of retroactivity under Senate Bill 42. It will be limited to the
potentially shorter sentences under the new Act and to the possible effects
of the new law.
11. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CON-
TEP. PRoBs. 528, 529 (1958).
12. S. RUBIN, supra note 8, at 157.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970) (repealed 1977).
14. ABA Comvm. ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SER vICES, SENTENCING
COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRA TiCE: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 8 (1974). For an
examination into the history of indeterminate sentencing, see Dershowitz,
Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 297, 304-15 (1974); Prettyman, supra note 2, at 13-14; Witmer, The
History, Theory and Results of Parole, 18 J. C iM. L.C. & P.S. 24 (1927-
1928).
15. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-93, 171 P.2d 958, 959 (1918).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970) (repealed 1977), provided that
[e]very person convicted of a public offense, for which imprison-
ment in any reformatory or state prison is now prescribed by law
shall .... be sentenced to be imprisoned in a state prison, but the
court in imposing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration of
the period of imprisonment.
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3023 (West 1970) (repealed 1977). It should be
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A theoretical underpinning of the indeterminate sentence was
that it would be administered by experts in the field of behavioral
sciences who were to help cure the convict of his sickness.' 8 Thus,
after the felon was sentenced to prison, the Adult Authority was
to help the convict rehabilitate himself by determining within stat-
utory limits the length of the term he would actually serve.19 The
Adult Authority was an administrative agency within the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 20  Its members2 ' were selected on the basis
of their "interest in corrections work including persons widely
experienced in the fields of corrections, sociology, law, law enforce-
ment, and education." 22 The Authority's purpose was to have a
non-judicial agency determine the appropriate length of imprison-
ment for each offender within its custody. 23 This agency had wide
discretion in allowing or refusing release from prison.24  The
noted that there was a set minimum below which the Adult Authority could
not fix felony sentences. By statute, it was set at six months. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 18(a) (West 1970) (repealed 1977).
18. People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 95, 473 P.2d 993, 996, 89 Cal. Rptr.
249, 252 (1970). See also Mitford, Kind and Unusual Punishment in Cal-
ifornia, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1971, at 46.
19. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 174, 534 P.2d 1001, 1006, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 102 (1975). Until a prisoner's term had been fixed by the Adult
Authority, he was considered to be serving the maximum term to which
he could have been sentenced. In re Mills, 55 Cal. 2d 646, 653-54, 361 P.2d
15, 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 483, 488 (1961). Thus, when life imprisonment was
the maximum term which the prisoner would suffer, he was considered
as serving a life sentence unless and until the Adult Authority otherwise
fixed his term. People v. Jones, 6 Cal. 2d 554, 59 P.2d 89 (1936).
For a detailed description of the Adult Authority, see Note, California
Department of Corrections and Adult Authority Decisionmaking Pro-
cedures for Male Felons, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1353 (1974); Comment, The Cal-
ifornia Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Deci-
sion as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5 U.C.D.L. REV. 360 (1972).
For an explanation of how varying the sentence length could aid in re-
habilitation efforts, see text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 5001, 5075-5082 (West 1970) (repealed 1977).
21. The Authority was composed of nine members appointed by the gov-
ernor, with the consent of the Senate for four-year terms. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 5075 (West 1970) (repealed 1977).
22. Id.
23. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 693, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918).
24. In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1967). Until recently (see text accompanying notes 99-122 infra), a pris-
oner did not have a right per se to a term of imprisonment fixed short
of the statutory maximum. See, e.g., Dorado v. Kerr, 454 F.2d 892, 897 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
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exercise of this discretion was ordinarily a matter immune from
judicial review.
25
Within the last twenty years 20 widespread disenchantment with
the indeterminate sentence has arisen.27 In addition, many experts
have perceived a trend away from indeterminate sentencing and
rehabilitation to definite sentences premised on the punishment of
offenders. 28 With Senate Bill 42, California demonstrates its dis-
approval of indeterminate sentencing and joins the trend in return-
ing to the definite sentence.
29
The Rationale Underlying Indeterminate Sentencing and Reasons
for the Return to Definite Sentences
Throughout the last sixty years, the California courts have deline-
ated several reasons for employing the indeterminate sentence.
First, unlike definite sentences,8 0 the indeterminate sentence pro-
vided an incentive to the offender to rehabilitate himself.3 1
25. Within the last several years, the California Supreme Court had be-
gun to cut back on this general rule. For example, the court in In re Rod-
riguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975), overturned
the California judicial precedent that the Adult Authority had complete
control over parole and sentence lengths. Comment, Indeterminate Sen-
tence Law-The California Adult Authority Has Duty to Fix Primary Term
of Sentence, In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr.
552 (1975), 3 W. ST. L. REv. 304, 307 (1976). See also text accompanying
notes 99-122 infra.
26. Prettyman, supra note 2, at 17.
27. The list is extensive. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SmV. COMM.,
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AIERICA
(1971); D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROoF 238-45 (1975); M. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES-LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973); J. MITFORD, KIND AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 79-94 (1973) [hereinafter cited as J. MITFORD]; R.
SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED 281-85 (1974); Prettyman,
supra note 2, at 17-21.
28. See Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philos-
ophy, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1161 (1974); Howard, Lubenow, & Lesner, The Pur-
pose of Prisons, NEWSWEK, Feb. 10, 1975, at 36; N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1976, §
C, col. 1, at 17; Big Change In Prisons: Punish-Not Reform, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD RPT., Aug. 25, 1975, at 21. But cf. Chaneles, Prisoners Can Be Re-
habilitated-Now, PSYCH. TODAY, Oct., 1975, at 129. (argues that there
should be a rehabilitation effort in spite of the apparent trend).
29. Among the states which have returned to a determinate sentence af-
ter experimenting with indeterminate sentencing are Louisiana, Kentucky,
Montana, Alabama, and South Carolina. S. RUBIN, supra note 8, at 157 n.125.
30. Tappan, supra note 11, at 529.
31. It is generally recognized by the courts and by modern penologists
that the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law ... [is] to put
before the prisoner great incentive to well-doing in order that his
will to do well should be strengthened and confirmed by the habit
of well-doing. Instead of trying to break the will of the offender
1180
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Through good behavior and self-rehabilitation, the offender could
substantially advance the date of his release.3 2 Thus, because the
offender "held the keys to release within his own hands,"3 he
would try to reform himself.
8 4
However, the conditions of California prisons made self-rehabili-
tation all but impossible.35 In addition, the experts who were to
help the prisoner rehabilitate himself were unqualified to predict
the optimum release date for the individual offender.36 Finally,
the indeterminate sentence often led inmates to cease attempts at
self-rehabilitation 7 because prison authorities frequently strung
and make him submissive, the purpose is to strengthen his will to
do right and lessen his temptation to do wrong.
In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692-93, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918). See also Pretty-
man, supra note 2, at 15.
32. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 416, 503 P.2d 921, 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
220 (1972). See also the discussion of shorter sentences under the indeter-
minate sentence law by the Colorado Supreme Court in Nugent v. District
Court, 184 Colo. 353, 356, 520 P.2d 592, 593 (1974).
33. Prettyman, supra note 2, at 15.
34. Id.
35. Folsom and San Quentin are disgraceful dungeons; Vacaville and
Soledad are wholly inadequate places to house human beings. It
is clear to the [California Committee on Criminal Justice] that the
physical facilities of these institutions are incompatible with funda-
mental and minimal standards of decency and humanity. They are
ancient, dark, depressing, and overcrowded-places of total hope-
lessness and despair. The term "human warehouse" would be an
accurate euphemism for these places. Prison administrators intone
the dogma that, despite all efforts and studies, they still do not
know why prisoners do not "rehabilitate themselves," why they are
not motivated to take advantage of prison programs. This is either
pretense or incompetence. No one can visit Folsom, San Quentin,
Soledad or Vacaville and fail to know the answer.
Murray, Ringer, & Alarcon, Prison Reform, Backward or Forward?, 50 CAL.
ST. B.J. 356, 361 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Prison Reform]. See also
Mitford, supra note 18, at 45-52.
36. Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358. In theory, Adult Authority
Board panelists were to be selected from various fields on the basis of their
expertise. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. In practice, they
were not.
The composition of the [1973 Adult Authority] board is not easily
squared with its self-appraisal. It is, with the lone exception of
a retired dentist, drawn from the ranks of law enforcement and Cor-
rections: former policemen, prosecutors, FBI and prison person-
nel--"eight cops and a dentist," as the prisoners call them.
J. M1hTFoRD, supra note 27, at 86.
37. Although there may have been no chance that the prisoner would
be released, a pointless hearing was conducted annually before the
[parole] board involving a litany of often-irrelevant questions put
to the prisoner. After this charade, he was denied parole and told
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along38 the inmate, never letting him know when he might eventu-
ally be released. As some experts have maintained, if there is no
rehabilitation, the entire case for the indeterminate sentence has
vanished.
3 9
A second reason announced by the courts for indeterminate sen-
tencing was to protect society from the premature release of
dangerous criminals. 40  By allowing the prison expert, rather
than the court or prosecutor, to evaluate the inmate's potential
threat to society, the indeterminate sentence more effectively pro-
tected the public than could definite sentencing.4 1 The determinate
sentence could keep the individual incarcerated only for a fixed
period of time. The indeterminate sentence restrained the inmate
until he no longer presented a threat to society.42 In addition, be-
cause many of the terms under the provisions of the indeterminate
sentence law provided for potential life imprisonment, the offender
will realize that he may be incarcerated for his entire life. There-
fore, the indeterminate sentence would also deter crime.
43
Yet critics of the indeterminate sentence have shown that there
is no reliable test by which to predict a prisoner's potential dan-
gerousness.44 Moreover, psychiatrists usually overpredict the indi-
vidual's potential danger to society.45  "The fact that errors of
to return next year; year after year the same procedure was re-
peated .... Prisoners soon perceived that an obsequious, servile
attitude was best calculated to meet with success. Such end-
less uncertainty and apparently-pointless hearings fostered well-
founded feelings of despair and offered prisoners little incentive to
attempt self-improvement in prison.
Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358.
38. Id. See also J. MITroRn, supra note 27, at 87-94.
39. Prettyman, supra note 2, at 18.
40. "One essential [element of the indeterminate sentencing system]
is that the state be able to adjust the length of sentence so that a person will
be supervised as long as he constitutes an unreasonable threat to life or
property . . . ." Anderson v. Nelson, 352 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (N.D. Cal.
1972). See also In re Cowen, 27 Cal. 2d 637, 648-49, 166 P.2d 279, 285 (1946);
In re Allen, 239 Cal. App. 2d 23, 25, 48 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1965).
41. See note 40 supra.
42. Id.
43. See generally J. ITFoRD, supra note 27, at 84-85; Comment, Use of
the Indeterminate Sentence in Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation, 7 DUKE
L.J. 65 (1958).
44. Among those who argue that an individual's dangerousness cannot
be predicted are: S. HALLECK, PSYCIATRY AND =ru DEMMAS OF Cniivn 313-
14 (1967); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U.
PA. L. Rzv. 439 (1974); Morris, supra note 28, at 1164-73; Reid, A Rebuttal
to the Attack on the Indeterminate Sentence, 51 WASH. L. REv. 565, 573-80
(1976); Steadman & Cocozza, We Can't Predict Who Is Dangerous, PsYcH.
TODAY, Jan. 1975, at 32.
45. A decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1966,
resulted in the freeing of a significant number of mentally ill per-
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underpredicting the possibilities of violence are more visible than
errors of overpredicting violence" has led psychiatrists to err on
the side of confining rather than releasing.40 Despite the lack
of reliable predicting factors, the Adult Authority often used inde-
terminate sentencing to confine minorities and unpopular political
figures in the name of rehabilitation and protection of society.
47
Such inequity, the critics claim, is cured by the definite sentence,
a sentence whose duration is not dependent upon the decision of
prison experts. Further, it is unclear whether the indeterminate
sentence helped deter crime.48 By specifying the exact sentence
sons who were predicted to be dangerous. But follow-up studies
indicate that these predictions of violence were grossly exaggerated,
that very few of the patients who were released and who psy-
chiatrists predicted would commit violent crimes did in fact com-
mit those crimes. Similar studies in other parts of the country have
produced similar conclusions.
Dershowitz, Imprisonment by Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A. J. 560, 563 (1971)
(footnotes omitted).
46. Id. In essence, the psychiatrists' slogan becomes: "When in doubt,
don't let 'em out." Id.
47. In effect the message conveyed to the prisoner is: "Keep this joint
running smoothly and we'll let you out sooner." Conversely, the
really "dangerous" criminal can be confined almost indefinitely,
and the decision as to who fits this definition rests, of course, with
the correctional authorities. This category is elastic enough to em-
brace the political nonconformist, the malcontent, the inmate leader
of an ethnic group, the 'persistent writ-writer, the psychotic, the
troublemaker. Any one of these may at the pleasure of his keepers
serve years beyond the normal term for his crime; if his sentence
carries a "life top," he may never get out.
J. MITFORD, supra note 27, at 82-83. See also Transcript, Cal. State Senate
Hearing on the Indeterminate Sentence Law 138-44 (Dec. 5, 1974) [here-
inafter cited as Senate Transcript] (on file with the San Diego Law Re-
view) (homosexuals and other minorities are discriminated against through
the use of the indeterminate sentence); STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note
27, at 145-53; Cargan & Coates, The Indeterminate Sentence and Judicial
Bias, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 144, 153 (1974) ("[T]he indeterminate sen-
tence has not eliminated judicial bias, including racial prejudice; it has
merely revised the way of expressing it"). For example, ex-convict
Michael Duke testified that the Adult Authority would give him the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment if he continued to produce the large number of
writs he had previously written. Senate Transcript, supra at 213-14. In
addition, militant George Jackson was discriminated against through the
use of the indeterminate sentence. See Coleman, Prisons: The Crime of
Treatment, 11 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 5, 7-8 (1974).
48. Debates wage both ways on the potential deterrent effect of the inde-
terminate sentence. The data which has been compiled is inconclusive,
however. As was noted by one court: "Absent empirical proof [of the de-
terrent effect of long sentences], such debates eventually wind up in a
1183
an offender will serve, the definite sentence may deter crime more
effectively than did the indeterminate sentence.
4
The final justification advanced for indeterminate sentencing was
that it kept hardened criminals behind bars and prevented young
or first-time offenders from serving disproportionately long sen-
tences.50 This was accomplished through the use of the wide sen-
tence ranges under the indeterminate sentence law.5 ' Thus, because
the culpability of two offenders convicted of a similar crime may be
highly dissimilar, the indeterminate sentence helped "match" the
length of the sentence to the needs of the individual offender.5 2
However, the fact that two offenders convicted of a similar crime
are sentenced to dissimilar terms of incarceration seems to violate
fundamental notions of fairness and justice.5 3 Further, disparity
in sentencing fails to take into account disparate life-styles within
society.54 The definite sentence law provides offenders with a
better sense of certainty and justice because all are treated in a
like manner.
55
In eliminating the indeterminate sentence from the California
Penal Code, the legislature may have considered some or all of these
arguments. However, the legislature's chief concern was with
draw." In re Maston, 33 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563, 109 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (1973)
(longer sentences for kidnappers). Moreover, excessively long periods of
confinement may increase recidivism rates. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note
47, at 15.
49. See, e.g., Senate Transcript, supra note 47, at 53, 160.
50. Prettyman, supra note 2, at 15-16.
51. Examples of crimes with wide sentence ranges include CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.5 (West 1970) (repealed 1977) (six months to 50 years for un-
lawful sexual intercourse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970) (re-
pealed 1977) (six months to life imprisonment for assault with a deadly
weapon).
52. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 416, 503 P.2d 921, 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
220 (1972); People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 642-43, 388 P.2d 33, 39-40, 36
Cal. Rptr. 201, 207-08 (1964);.AnumT AUTHORITY POLICY STATEMENT No. 42,
adopted Mar. 27, 1973; Prettyman, supra note 2, at 16.
53. "The prisoner in a state prison serving 10 years can well wonder why
another man on the same cell tier but from another county has a 2-year
sentence for the same or even a more serious offense." McGee, A New Look
at Sentencing, 38 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (1974).
54. "Our desire to maximize the democratic values of self-determina-
tion- necessarily calls for maximum tolerance for disparate life-
styles. To cope with the problem of maintaining a workable coop-
erative relationship between individuals in extremely complex
social organizations, we ought to fit the punishment to the crime,
not the person."
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 147.
55. McAnany, Merritt, & Tromanhauser, Illinois Reconsiders "Flat Time":
An Analysis of the Impact of the Justice Model, 52 CHr.-KENT L. REv. 621,
626 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Flat Time].
1184
[VOL. 14: 1176, 1977] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the disparity in sentences for like offenses. A specific provision
of the Penal Code now mandates the elimination of disparity and
the promotion of uniformity in sentencing.5 6
The legislature was also concerned with the possible effects
definite sentencing would have on alleviating prison unrest.5 7 Un-
der the indeterminate sentence law, an inmate would not ordinarily
know when he would be released. This uncertainty, coupled with
the arbitrariness 8 of the Adult Authority in determining the length
of incarceration, was a major factor in prison violence.5 9 The re-
turn to definite sentences should help alleviate much of the prison
unrest associated with the injustices and capriciousness of indeter-
minate sentencing.0
Yet the new law is somewhat paradoxical. In the name of fair-
ness and justice to the prison inmate, 61 California has rejected the
progressive theory of prisoner rehabilitation, substituting for it a
system of penal laws whose primary purpose is punishment.
62
However, by enacting Senate Bill 42, California is in keeping with
the current trend in penal institutions' philosophy by both rejecting
the concept of rehabilitation and declaring that the sole purpose
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a) (1) (West Supp. 1977).
57. As Dr. Lee Coleman, noted Berkeley psychiatrist, testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions
[A]lthough there's no way to gather data on this that I know of,
I am personally convinced, at any rate, that most of the violence
in [California] prisons is caused. . . by the frustration and the bit-
terness and the rage and the despair which results from[a pris-
oner] not knowing how long he has to be there and from a certain
group of people having complete control over that decision, the
capriciousness and arbitrariness of that system.
Senate Transcript, supra note 47, at 61. See also id. at 3, 10; Flat Time,
supra note 55, at 626.
58. See, e.g., Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358.
59. See note 57 supra.
60. Although it is too soon to tell under the new system, Raymond Pro-
cunier, past Director of the Department of Corrections, ran a limited survey
on a determinate sentencing system used in California in 1975. He said
that the determinate sentence had "reduced prison violence and increased
motivation of prisoners in job-training and education programs." Davis En-
terprise, June 20, 1976, pt. 1, at 1, col. 2 (on file with the San Diego Law
Review). See also S.F. Examiner & Chronicle, Dec. 8, 1974, § A, at 3, col.
1 (on file with the San Diego Law Review). In addition, the good-time
provisions under the new law could help reduce the level of violence in
California prisons. See Senate Transcript, supra note 47, at 19.
61. Oppenheim, Computing a Determinate Sentence . . . New Math Hits
the Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 604, 659 (1976).
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (a) (1) (West Supp. 1977).
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of prisons is punishment of offenders.0 3  But if sentences are, as
critics maintain,64 to be shorter than under prior law, will that not
contradict the new primary purpose of California prisons-to pun-
ish the offender?65 Assuming there will be shorter sentences,
would shorter sentences punish the offender better than longer
terms? A discussion of the new law and its potential for shortening
sentences will answer these questions.
SENATE BILL 42: AN OVERVIEW 66
Under the prior indeterminate sentence law, felonies were usually
punished by prison sentences of minimums and maximums. 7 The
new law substitutes the indeterminate sentence with four fixed sen-
tence ranges containing three statutory choices within each range.66
The new law should not change the sentences allotted for misde-
meanor crimes under the pre-Senate Bill 42 law. Neither will the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act affect such life-sentence
63. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text infra.
65. In the text accompanying notes 65-157 infra, the author assumes that
the severity of a sentence is directly related to the sentence length. There-
fore, it will be assumed that a longer sentence constitutes a more severe
punishment than does a shorter term of imprisonment. See Coleman, supra
note 47, at 15. See generally Wang, The Metaphysics of Punishment-An
Exercise in Futility, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 306 (1976).
66. Senate Bill 42 was first introduced on December 2, 1974. The Bill was
finally passed by the Senate on August 30, 1976, and was signed into law
by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. on September 20, 1976. The legislation
became effective on July 1, 1977.
Senate Bill 42's main author was Republican Senator John A. Nejedly,
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions. Chief en-
dorsers of the new law included the California Attorney General, the Dis-
trict Attorney's Association, the California Peace Officers Association, and
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. See Letter from Senator John A. Nejedly
to All Interested Persons Regarding Retroactivity Provisions of Senate Bill
42, 2 (Sept. 2, 1976) (This letter is on file with the San Diego Law Re-
view).
67. Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, 1976, Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.,
ch. 1139, 301.
68.
Sentence Examples of the Crimes
Range Base Term within each Range
Range 1 16 months, 2 or 3 years Burglary 2, Receiving Stolen
Property, Grand Theft, Forgery
Range 2 2, 3, or 4 years Burglary 1, Robbery (unarmed),
Manslaughter, Mayhem
Simple Kidnapping Sale of
Range 3 3, 4, or 5 years Heroin, Rape, Lewd act w/Child
Range 4 5, 6, or 7 years Murder 2
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crimes as first degree murder,6 9 trainwrecking,7 0 or kidnapping for
robbery or ransom7 1-sentences which remain life terms under the
new law. Finally, the new law will not affect the judge's authority
to impose a fine, probation, jail, or suspended sentence.72
After the court has determined that the felon should be sentenced
to prison, it will look to the three statutory choices provided under
the violated statute. The trial court will then order the middle
of the three provided terms "unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime."73 The new legislation also
provides for good-time credits-a reduction of up to one-third of the
felon's sentence for good behavior and participation in rehabilita-
tion programs while in prison.
74
Moreover, the new law fixes definite terms for various enhance-
ments-additions to the provided base terms incidental to the
charged felony.75 Under prior law, enhancements were indeter-
minate in nature.70 However, under Senate Bill 42, the enhance-
ments will be of definite duration.77 For example, if a felon were
convicted of second degree burglary under the new law, he would
be sentenced to a base term of either sixteen months, or two or
three years.7 8 If he were armed with a deadly weapon,79 or if he
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1977).
70. Id. § 218.
71. Id. § 209.
72. Id. § 1170(a) (2).
73. Id. § 1170(b).
74. Id. §§ 2930-2932. Thus, up to four months may be reduced for each
eight months served in prison. Three months of this four month reduction
shall be based upon forbearance from physically assaultive behavior, includ-
ing assault with a weapon, escape, and intentional destruction of state prop-
erty in excess of $50. The remaining one month shall be awarded for par-
ticipation in "work, educational, vocational, therapeutic or other prison
activities." Id. § 2931 (c). The new law also sets up extensive guidelines for
revocation of good-time credits. See id. §§ 2931-2932. For a discussion of
why the good-time credits will not reduce the time served under Senate
Bill 42 versus the prior indeterminate sentence law, see text accompanying
notes 143-57 infra.
75. For a discussion of enhancements under the new law, see notes 148-
55 and accompanying text infra.
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022 (West 1970) (repealed 1977) provided that
a felon would serve a five-to-ten year term for being armed with a deadly
weapon in the commission of a crime.
77. Id. (West Supp. 1977) (one year for being armed with a deadly
weapon in the commission of a crime); id. § 12022.7 (three years for in-
tentionally inflicting great bodily injury during a crime).
78. Id. § 461.
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inflicted great bodily injury during the course of the burglary,80
his base term would be enhanced by a one- or three-year term of
additional imprisonment, respectively.8 '
Finally, the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act replaces the
Adult Authority and Women's Board of Terms and Parole with the
Community Release Board.8 2 The Board will be chiefly concerned
with alleviating sentence disparity, granting or denying parole,
reviewing parole conditions, and considering prisoner's requests for
denied good-time credits.83
WILL SENATE BILL 42 SHORTEN SENTENCES?-THE MYTH
OF SHORTENED SENTENCES FOR CALIFORNIA OFFENDERS
Although Senate Bill 42, when first passed,84 was applauded
79. Id. § 12022.
80. Id. § 12022.7.
81. The following is an example of how sentences will be computed un-
der the new law. The hypothetical case used is that of a felon who had
served a prior sentence for forcible rape, and who is now convicted of
forcible rape with great bodily injury to the victim. His term would be
computed as follows:
Offense: Forcible Rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261)
Base Term Range: 3, 4, or 5 years (Cal. Penal Code § 264)
Middle of the Three Terms (Cal. Penal Code § 1170 (b) ):
4 years = 4 yrs.
Plus Enhancements:
(1) Great Bodily Injury to Victim (3 year add-on to base term)
- 3 yrs.
(2) Prior Violent Felony* (3 year add-on to the base term)
- 3 yrs.
Sentence given by trial court: 10 yrs.
Maximum good-time credits earned while in prison (up to 13 reduction
in sentence given by trial court): MA of 10 years=3.3 yrs.
Sentence given by trial court (10 years) minus maximum good-time credits
(3.3 years) equals 6.7 years.
Minimum Term to be Served: ,6.7 yrs.
* See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West Supp. 1977) for a list of what
are termed violent felonies under the new law.
82. Id. § 5078(a) & (b). The Board will be composed in part of the same
individuals who served on the Adult Authority and Women's Board of
Terms and Parole. Id. § 5075.
83. Id. § 5077. The main difference between the Board and the Adult
Authority will be one of degree. Although the new law is not completely
determinate-since a convict may receive good-time credits which thereby
reduce his term--Senate Bill 42 provides a more determinate sentencing
system than accorded under prior law. Hence, the Board will have substan-
tially less arbitrary power than did the Adult Authority. It will be able to
deny good-time credits for good cause, but it will no longer be able to
despotically control inmates through the use of long indeterminate sen-
tences.
84. See note 66 supra for a brief examination into the history of Senate
Bill 42.
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by most members of government, press, and courts,8 5 its opponents
were quick to mount a drive to repeal the act.8s They contended
that under prior law a convict often served a potential of life im-
prisonment, while under the new law the highest of the three statu-
tory choices falls far short of life imprisonment.8 7 On the surface,
the critics' position appears sound-all the Senate Bill 42 terms
appear to be far shorter than under prior law.8
It is true that the new law's terms seem too short to satisfy the
legislature's primary purpose of incarceration-to punish the of-
85. See L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1976, pt. I, at 1, col. 5.
86. L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 1976, pt. I, at 30, col. 1. One of the main critics
of Senate Bill 42 was Los Angeles Police Chief Ed Davis. In calling for
the repeal of the new law, Davis characterized the statute as "The Great
Prison Break" because it would result in substantially shorter sentences for
most California offenders. Id. at 26, col. 5. Other major critics of the
potentially shorter sentences included Los Angeles County District Attorney
John Van de Kamp, San Diego District Attorney Ed Miller, and Los Angeles
Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess. Id. at 29, col. 1; id. Dec. 7, 1976, pt. I, at 26,
col. 5.
87. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supp. 1977) (five, six, or
seven years for second degree murder) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West
1970) (repealed 1977) (five years to life imprisonment for second degree
murder).
88.
Offense Committed* Prior Lawt Senate Bill 42
Robbery/lst degree (P.C. § 211) 5 years to life 2, 3, or 4 years
Robbery/2d degree (P.C. § 211) 1 year to life 2, 3, or 4 years
Burglary/lst degree (P.C. § 461) 5 years to life 2, 3, or 4 years
Burglary/2d degree (P.C. § 461) 1 to 15 years 16 months, 2,
or 3 years
Rape (P.C. § 264) 3 years to life 3, 4, or 5 years
Assault wv/deadly weapon (P.C. § 245) 6 mos. to life 2, 3, or 4 years
* All references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
t Although second degree robbery, first degree burglary, and rape were
"open-ended" violations-that is, they read: "not less than one year," "not
less than five years," and "not less than three years," respectiely-the
implied maximum was life imprisonment under CAL. PENAL CODE § 671
(West 1970) (repealed 1977). It should be noted that under id. § 461
(repealed 1977) (second degree burglary), a felon could be sent to county
jail for up to one year, instead of state prison for 1 to 15 years. How-
ever, but for this one exception, the prior terms appear to be longer. In
addition, although first degree robbery under the new law will be limited
to robbery of professional drivers operating motor vehicles used to trans-
port people for hire, this Comment, to maintain continuity with the prior
Penal Code, will continue to consider non-enhanced armed robbery under
the new law as "Robbery/ist degree." See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211(a) &
213 (West Supp. 1977).
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fender.8 9 However, because the sentencing structure of the Califor-
nia judiciary had already made a de facto shift to determinate sen-
tencing,90 the sentences employed under the statute will not be
significantly shorter than the terms previously served by California
prisoners.
Prior Trend in California Case Law Toward the Determinate
Sentence
As recently as 1975, the convict had no right to a term set at
less than the statutory maximum.91 However, in a series of cases
beginning in 1972, the California Supreme Court decreased the
Adult Authority's plenary discretion to fix a felon's term of
imprisonment.
9 2
The first of these cases is In re Lynch.9 3 After spending over
five years in prison for indecent exposure,9 4 the defendant chal-
lenged his potential life sentence on the ground that it violated the
cruel or unusual punishment clause of the California Constitu-
tion.95 The California Supreme Court concluded that the constitu-
tional validity of the statute must be evaluated with reference to
the potential life sentence, regardless of whether a lesser term could
be fixed by the Adult Authority. The court held that the penalty
prescribed in the statute violated the prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment because the punishment was grossly dispropor-
tionate to the offense committed.9 7 In its holding, Lynch laid the
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a) (1) (West Supp. 1977).
90. See text accompanying notes 91-122 infra.
91. Prior to the 1975 decisions in People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534
P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975), and In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639,
537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975), the law generally held that "[o]ne
who is legally convicted has no vested right to the determination of his
sentence at less than maximum." In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 302,
425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 604 (1967). See also In re Cohen,
27 Cal. 2d 637, 641, 166 P.2d 279, 281 (1946); In re Clutchette, 39 Cal. App.
3d 561, 566, 114 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (1974).
92. See text accompanying notes 93-122 infra.
93. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
94. The defendant in Lynch was convicted of misdemeanor indecent ex-
posure in violation of former Penal Code section 311 and was sentenced
to two years probation. Nine years later, he was again convicted of inde-
cent exposure and was sentenced under Former Penal Code section 314
which provided that "[u]pon the second and each subsequent conviction
[for indecent exposure] . . .every person so convicted is guilty of a felony,
and is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for not less than one
year."
95. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 (amended Nov. 5, 1974) (current version at
art. I, § 17).
96. 8 Cal. 3d at 419, 503 P.2d at 926, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
97. "[A] punishment may violate ... the Constitution if, although not
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foundation for subsequent cases which eroded the Adult Author-
ity's power to fix or fail to fix sentences short of the statutory
maximum 8
Three years after Lynch, the California Supreme Court decided
People v. Wingo.9 9 In Wingo, the defendant was convicted of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
under former Penal Code section 245(a),100 and was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of imprisonment. As in Lynch, the defend-
ant in Wingo contended that his potential life sentence constituted
cruel or unusual punishment. However, "unlike Lynch . . . [the
court in Wingo was] concerned with a maximum penalty which
might be permissible in some circumstances but excessive in
others."1" In Lynch, there were no circumstances under which
a life sentence for a second offense exhibitionist would be valid.
However, the court in Wingo concluded that there may be circum-
stances under which a life term for assault under Penal Code sec-
tion 245 (a) would constitute appropriate punishment. 10 2 Although
the challenged statute in Wingo may have been suspect under
cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for
which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity." Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
226 (footnote omitted).
98. Comment, Modifying the Indeterminate Sentence: The Changing
Emphasis in Criminal Punishment, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 410-11 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Changing Emphasis].
99. 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a) (West 1970) (repealed 1977) provided
that such an offense was "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for six months to life."
101. 14 Cal. 3d at 176, 534 P.2d at 1007, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (emphasis
added).
102. The difference in analysis rested upon the type of statute which was
challenged:
If a statute proscribes a single, narrowly delineated mode of be-
havior-as in Lynch-it is appropriate in considering the constitu-
tionality of the penalty to look only to the maximum in order to
determine whether under any circumstances the crime would jus-
tify the punishment. But this analytic proves inconclusive when
applied to a statute regulating a broad variety of conduct [as in
Wingo], since by definition there is no single "offense" to measure
against the subject penalty.
Id. at 182, 534 P.2d at 1011, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 107. But cf. Note, Prohibiting
Cruel or Unusual Punishment: California's Requirement of Proportionate
Sentencing After Wingo and Rodriguez, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 524, 528-30 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Proportionate Sentencing] (author questions the
Wingo court's attempted differentiation between the two decisions).
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Lynch, the court nevertheless upheld the challenged Penal Code
section.1
0 3
Under a Lynch analysis, the court should have denied the defend-
ant's petition for relief after it had determined that the statute in
Wingo was valid on its face.104 But Wingo went beyond the Lynch
decision, holding that while the statutory sentence did not consti-
tute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the California Con-
stitution, the "sentence may be unconstitutionally excessive either
because the Adult Authority has fixed a term disproportionate to
the offense or, in some circumstances, because no term whatever
has been set." 0 5
The Wingo court held that a felon who is convicted under a
section encompassing a wide range of conduct has an "undeniable
vested right" to have his term fixed proportionately to his individ-
ual culpability. 0 6 The imprisonment determined by the Adult
Authority was then to be analyzed as to whether the statute, as
applied to the defendant, was constitutional. According to this
analysis, if the Authority failed to fix the term within a "reason-
able time," the statutory maximum would be employed'0" in deter-
mining whether the type of offense, the absence of violence, or the
individual's past history, age, or culpability merit such a sen-
tence. 08
By extending judicial review to include the actual exercise of the
Authority's term-fixing power, Wingo constitutes a further revision
of the Adult Authority's plenary discretion to fix or fail to fix
prisoners' terms short of the statutory maximum. 0 9 "Thus, Wingo
is a logical extension of Lynch. Both evince an increasing judicial
103. 14 Cal. 3d at 180, 534 P.2d at 1010, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
104. Although this argument was expressly rejected by the court in In
re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 649, 537 P.2d 384, 391, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 559
(1975) prior to Wingo-Rodriguez, cases that addressed a Lynch challenge
would ordinarily not go beyond the test outlined in Lynch in adjudicating
the statute's validity. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 42 Cal. App. 3d 706, 711,
117 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1974); People v. Morgan, 36 Cal. App. 3d 444, 449,
111 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1973). But cf. People v. Kingston, 44 Cal. App.
3d 629, 636, 118 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1974), which held that, even though
the statute was valid on its face, it was unconstitutionally applied to the
particular defendant. See also In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073,
112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (invalidating a statutory penalty which, al-
though proportional to many serious offenders, was not proportional
to this particular defendant.)
105. 14 Cal. 3d at 182, 534 P.2d at 1012, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
106. Id.
107. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 654 n.18, 537 P.2d 384, 395 n.18, 122
Cal. Rptr. 552, 563 n.18 (1975).
108. Id. at 654, 537 P.2d at 395, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
109. Changing Emphasis, supra note 98, at 412.
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tendency to limit the constitutional authority of the legislature and
offset the administrative discretion of the Adult Authority with a
judicial standard of proportionality.11O
Shortly after the Wingo ruling, the California Supreme Court
decided In re Rodriguez."' The defendant in Rodriguez had been
convicted of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child and had been
sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a maxi-
mum of life.11 2 As in Wingo, the Rodriguez court upheld the stat-
ute in question because the potential life sentence for its violation
may be proper. 113 While reiterating the Wingo requirement "that
the Authority must fix terms ... that are not disproportionate to
the culpability of the individual offender," 1 4 the Rodriguez court
swept beyond Wingo, holding that the Adult Authority would now
be required to set "primary terms" proportionate to the prisoner's
culpability." 5 The "primary term" requirement mandated that the
Adult Authority promptly delineate a proportionate term for each
prisoner upon commitment."16 This term must be fixed with a
"substantial degree of certainty," 17 and once fixed, it could not
be redetermined upward."18 As one commentator has noted:
110. Id.
111. 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West 1970) (repealed 1977) provided that
the punishment for such conduct was imprisonment "in the State prison
for a term of from one year to life." After serving 22 years in prison, the
defendant challenged the sentence as excessive. He argued that the Adult
Authority had abused its discretion in failing to fix his term at less than
life, and in failing to grant him parole. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639,
642-43, 537 P.2d 384, 386-87, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 554-55 (1975).
113. 14 Cal. 3d at 647, 537 P.2d at 390, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
114. Id. at 652, 537 P.2d at 393, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
115. Id. In addition, the court noted that if the terms were not
"promptly fixed," the constitutionality of the convict's term would be de-
termined in reference to the statutory maximum. Id. at 654 n.18, 537 P.2d
at 395 n.18, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 563 n.18. Further, the individual's term must
be based on factors present at the time of the offense, that is, the convict's
primary term had to be based on that particular crime, and not on "irrele-
vant, post-conviction factors." Id.
116. Id. at 652-53, 537 P.2d at 393-94, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62. Prior to
Rodriguez, the Adult Authority normally set terms only when the convict's
application for parole was considered. Id. at 646, 537 P.2d at 389, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 557. Thus, a convict might have to wait for many years without
either a parole date or ultimate release date-and the deferment of his
parole "readiness" would therefore prolong the indeterminacy of his term.
In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1033-34, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526 (1976).
117. Changing Emphasis, supra note 98, at 414.
118. Id.
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A major consequence of these combined judicial declarations has
been to advance California substantially along the continuum from
an indeterminate sentencing system toward a determinate system.
. . . [C]oupling prompt term-fixing with the edict to ignore post-
conviction factors in fixing the term should merge California's sys-
tem into the sentencing perspective associated with determinate
sentencing systems.119
The Lynch-Wingo-Rodriguez standard constitutes a severe reduc-
tion in the Adult Authority's power. Prior to these cases, an inmate
serving an indeterminate sentence had no right to a term fixed
short of the statutory maximum.120 However, by requiring that
a prisoner's term be set proportionately to those served by other
prisoners for similar crimes, as well as requiring that the prisoner's
term be fixed proportionately to his individual culpability, the
California Supreme Court severely reduced the Authority's term-
fixing discretion.
12 '
Because the prisoner's sentence must reflect his individual culpa-
bility at the time of the offense in order to withstand constitutional
scrutiny, the new statute does not appear to shorten most offenders'
sentences.122 Hence, assuming the Senate Bill 42 sentences are sub-
stantially similar to the Adult Authority release dates set in
response to Rodriguez, the conclusion can be made that it was the
California Supreme Court, and not the new law, which shortened
sentences.
Length of Terms Set by the Adult Authority'
2 3
Amid prison disturbances protesting the inequities of the indeter-
minate sentencing system, especially the Adult Authority's policy
119. Proportionate Sentencing, supra note 102, at 537-38.
120. See note 91 supra.
121. Changing Emphasis, supra note 98, at 414.
122. See note 115 supra.
123. Under prior California law, the Adult Authority had two distinct
discretionary functions: (1) fixing sentences within the statutory minimum
and maximum terms for an inmate's offense, and (2) granting parole. For
example, although a convict may serve only three years for committing a
felony, technically his sentence may extend far beyond his release or parole
date. Although California courts have consistently held that a parolee is
"constructively a prisoner . .. fettered by the conditions and restrictions
of his parole," People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 40 Cal. Rptr.
100, 103 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965), many authorities criticize
this "constructive custody" approach. See United States v. Consuelo-Gon-
zalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO COR-
ncTioNs 33 (1969); Note, Parole: A Critique of Its Legal Foundations and
Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 713-14 (1963); Comment, The Parole Sys-
tem, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv. 282, 289-95 (1971). Consequently, in the text accom-
panying notes 124-56 infra, this Comment will compare the actual time
served by a felon under the prior law with the actual time he will serve
under Senate Bill 42.
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of "stringing along" inmates serving indeterminate sentences,'2 4 the
Adult Authority offered to provide determinate sentences as early
as 1972.125 However, after considerable fanfare and publicity
announcing the new term-fixing policy, the Adult Authority ceased
to follow its promised policy.
126
Because of increased political pressure, by March 1975, the Adult
Authority re-initiated the determinate sentencing system with fixed
release dates for most felons.127 The Authority set these dates with
reference to the median time served under the prior law.128  The
Authority would first set a "base term" for the convict's sentence
in accordance with his particular offense. 29  Then other factors,
such as prior convictions, consecutive terms, violence of the crime,
and use of a weapon, would be taken into account before determin-
ing the sentence to be imposed. 30
This policy was first issued in codified form in mid-April 1975. 31'
A major provision of the new policy was that once a release date
had been fixed, the date could not be rescinded except for "miscon-
duct or under extraordinary circumstances."' 32  The California
Adult Authority had, by this time, nearly abandoned the concept
of the indeterminate sentence and had adopted a determinate sen-
tencing system in its place.133
After In re Rodriguez, the Adult Authority issued a second policy
directive which established separate standards for term-fixing and
limited the April policy directive to parole date fixing.13 4 The new
124. For an example of this policy in action, see note 37 supra.
125. J. MITFORD, supra note 27, at 87.
126. Id.
127. Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358. For the exact reasons the
Adult Authority decided to fix sentences, see L.A. Daily Journal, Aug. 21,
1975, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
128. Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1033, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 525
(1976).
132. Letter from the Chairman, California Adult Authority to All Inmates
Under Jurisdiction of Adult Authority, Apr. 15, 1975. This provision was
later changed to require mere "good cause" for revocation. See 15 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE § 2102(b) (2) (1976).
133. Prison Reform, supra note 35, at 358.
134. In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 526
(1976).
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directive established a base term from the most serious offense for
which the prisoner was currently committed. 135 It also directed
a selection of either a typical or an aggravated sentencing range for
the base offense, and included an attached schedule of felonies with
typical and aggravated ranges.138 The directive also provided that
prior, concurrent, or consecutive sentences could be added onto
the provided base terms.137 By late 1975, both the Adult Authority
and Women's Board of Terms and Parole had begun to implement
the Rodriguez decision by fixing primary terms for nearly all
inmates.1
38
The "indeterminate" sentences imposed by the Adult Authority
and the sentences set under Senate Bill 42 do not differ substan-
tially.3 9 The new law's typical sentences are as long, if not longer,
than those provided by the Adult Authority. In addition, the
aggravated or enhanced provisions 140 under the new law are ap-
plicable to all offenses, whereas under the prior law they were
restricted to a few.' 4'
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 15 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 2153-2154, 2226 (1976).
138. Comment, supra note 25, at 311 n.66.
139. A comparison of the release dates in the policy directives with sen-
tences under Senate Bill 42 demonstrates their similarity:
Adult Authority Terms* Senate Bill 42 Termst
Offense Committed Typical Aggravated Typical Aggravated
(in months) (in months)
Robbery/ist degree 30-36 37-44 24-48 36-72
Robbery/2d degree 18-30 31-42 24-48 36-72
Burglary/lst degree 24-30 31-36 24-48 36-72
Burglary/2d degree 16-22 23-28 12-36 24-60
Assault w/deadly wep. 24-32 33-38 24-48 36-72
Rape 30-48 49-60 36-60 48-84
* 15 CAL. ADmwx. CODE § 2225 (1976).
t Although there are neither "typical" nor "aggravated" ranges under
Senate Bill 42, the "typical" range figures in this table are the three base
terms provided within each particular statute. For example, first degree
burglary under the new law is punishable by a sentence of either 24,
36, or 48 months. CAL. PENAL CODE § 461 (West Supp. 1977). Thus, the
Senate Bill 42 "typical" range under this particular statute will be from
24-48 months.
In addition, "aggravated" ranges for Senate Bill 42 terms in this table
consist of potential enhancements to the provided base term. The three
mentioned enhancements are: CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022 (West Supp. 1977)
(one year for being armed with a deadly weapon during the commission
of a crime); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West Supp. 1977) (two years for
using a firearm in the commission of a crime); and CAL. PENAL CODE §
12022.7 (West Supp. 1977) (three years for inflicting great bodily injury in
the course of a crime).
140. Id. §§ 12022.5, 12022.7 (West Supp. 1977).
141. Letter from Senator John A. Nejedly to All Interested Persons,
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Comparison of Terms Actually Served Under the Adult Author-
ity: 1974
Although the terms set under Senate Bill 42 seem shorter than
the terms accorded under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of imprisonment is misleading, for relatively few
convicts serve the absolute maximum statutory sentence.
142 Thus,
it is more accurate to compare the actual time served under the
prior law with the sentence a convict will now receive under the
new statute.
An examination of the median time served in prison by male
felons before their first parole reveals that most of the Senate Bill
42 terms appear to be less than the median time served under the
pre-1975 law.143 In addition, if the felon is an "ideal offender"--
one who cooperates with prison authorities, who does not have a
past record, and whose crime is unenhanced by any acts incidental
Sept. 20, 1976, S.B. 42 Sentences 2 [hereinafter cited as SB 42 Sentences]
(on file with the office of the San Diego Law Review). Under the prede-
cessors to CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022 & 12022.5 (West Supp. 1977), the en-
hancement provisions were not applicable to certain crimes. See People
v. Bauer, 1 Cal. 3d 368, 461 P.2d 637, 82 Cal. Rptr. 357, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 927 (1970) (section 12022 not applicable to burglary); People v.
Cervantes, 13 Cal. App. 3d 587, 91 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1971) (section 12022 not
applicable to assault with a deadly weapon). CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5
(West 1970) (repealed 1977) was limited to certain enumerated crimes, in-
cluding rape, kidnapping, and burglary.
142. One estimate has put the number of inmates serving the entire sen-
tence at 5% of the total prison population. See Note, California Depart-
ment of Corrections and Adult Authority Decisionmaking Procedures for
Male Felons, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1353, 1364 (1974).
143.
1974 Median Terms Terms Served
under the By Middle Senate Bill 42
Offense Indeterminate Sentence* 80% of Felons Median Termst
(in months) (in months) (in months)
Robbery/lst degree 42 29-82 36
Robbery/2d degree 34 23-58 36
Burglaryllst degree 38 22-74 36
Burglary/2d degree 27 18-49 24
Assault w/deadly weap. 37 26-70 36
Rape 48 32-85 48
* State of California: Health and Welfare Agency, Dep't of Corrections,
(1974) Tab. 33A, Offense, Ethnic Group and Time Served in Prison:
Male Felons Paroled for the First Time (on file with the San Diego Law
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to the charged felony-he will apparently have a shorter sentence
than that accorded under prior law because he will get a one-third
reduction in the Act's median term for good-time credits.
Yet the 1974 figures are medians. Thus, even though some
"ideal offenders" may have received longer sentences under prior
law, in all probability the "ideal offender" served a sentence
shorter than the 1974 median figures. 1 4" Because the "ideal offend-
er" had a much shorter term, the Senate Bill 42 median term,
less good-time credits, is probably near the terms served under
prior law.
14 5
In addition, the new terms appear shorter than the 1974 median
sentences because they do not take into account potential enhance-
ments to the charged felony. Many rapes, assaults, and armed
robberies were probably enhanced in some form.140 While the 1974
medians represent certain enhancements to the base sentences, the
Senate Bill 42 figures are median terms absent enhancements.
Therefore, enhancement(s) to the base term must also be included
in the final computation of the felon's sentence to accurately reflect
the true Senate Bill 42 sentence.1 4 7 Thus, the felon's base term
is increased if he inflicts great bodily injury,148 uses a firearm,140
Review).
t The Senate Bill 42 term contained in the table is the middle of the
three provided base terms. The middle term will usually be the base term
to which the trial court will sentence the felon. See text accompanying
note 73 supra.
144. Although the Adult Authority does not maintain records of parole
release dates which differentiate between the terms served by first time of-
fenders and repeaters, considerations such as prior sentences and violence of
the crime would tend to increase the length of the sentence. See text ac-
companying notes 130, 137 supra. Consequently, an "ideal offender" would
serve much less time than other inmates. But c.f. Senate Transcript, supra
note 47, at 136-37 (representative of prisoner organization argued that
"first-timers" may serve more time than "repeaters").
145. See note 144 supra.
146. Although the Adult Authority does not "break down" sentences into
the amount of additional time served for enhancements, the 1975 F.B.I.
UNiFomV CRIME REPORs 24 states that the above mentioned crimes are con-
sidered violent crimes against the person and in the case of armed robbery,
"frequently results in injury to the victim." Additionally, other non-vio-
lent enhancements will be included in the base term computation, includ-
ing concurrent terms, prior terms, and taking or damage in excess of statu-
tory amounts. See notes 148-55 and accompanying text infra.
147. SB 42 Sentences, supra note 141, at 1.
148. CAL. PENAL CODE: § 12022.7 (West Supp. 1977) provides an additional
three-year term for intentionally inflicting great bodily injury in the com-
mission of a crime when said injury is not an element of the offense.
149. Id. § 12022.5 provides an additional two year term for using a fire-
arm in the commission of a crime, which use is not an element of the
offense.
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or is armed with a deadly weapon'50 during the commission of the
offense. Moreover, if the felon is convicted of any felony' 51 and
has served a prior term for either a violent'
52 or non-violent 5 3
offense, his base term is increased accordingly. Finally, the new
law provides for definite or "fixed" enhancements if the felon is
to serve consecutive sentences,15 4 or if he took or damaged property
in excess of statutory limits. 55 Therefore, even assuming that the
convict receives maximum good time credits under the new law,
if enhancements are included in the final computation of the Senate
Bill 42 terms, these terms do not appear to deviate from the prior
1974 medians. 156
150. Id. § 12022 provides an additional one year term for being armed
with a deadly weapon during the commission of a crime, when arming is
not an element of the offense. No more than one out of the three enhance-
ments mentioned in notes 148-50 supra may be added to any one sentence,
and these enhancements may not be added to increase the one-third of the
middle term sentence for consecutive sentences. Id. §§ 1170.1a (a) & (d).
151. Id. § 667.5(b).
152. Id. § 667.5 (a) provides an additional three year term for prior vio-
lent terms where the present offense is one of violence. If the felon has
remained free of prison custody and felony conviction for 10 years, this
section is inapplicable.
153. Id. § 667.5(b) provides an additional one year term for prior non-
violent terms. If the felon has remained free of prison custody for five
years, this section is inapplicable.
154. Id. § 1170.1a provides an additional term of one-third the middle
base term for which the convict is presently convicted. However, the ag-
gregate enhancements for prior terms, as specified in CAL. PENAL CODE §
667.5 (b) (West Supp. 1977), plus consecutive sentence enhancements may
not exceed five years. Id. § 1170.1a(e). Also, except for those crimes
enumerated in id. § 667.5 (c), or for felonies involving arming, use of a fire-
arm, or great bodily injury, the term of imprisonment may not exceed
twice the base term imposed by the trial court. Id. § 1170.1a (f).
155. Id. § 12022.6 (a) provides additional punishment of one-half the
base term for taking or damage in excess of $100,000; id. § 12022.6 (b) pro-
vides additional punishment equal to two times the base term for taking or
damage in excess of $500,000. These enhancements are not available if the
taking or damage resulted from such crimes as burglary, robbery, or arson.
All enhancements in notes 148-55 supra must be charged and proved. The
trial court must then sentence upon the enhancements unless it determines
there are circumstances in mitigation of the additional punishment. If there
are such circumstances in mitigation, the court must provide its reasons for
sentence reduction within the record. SB 42 Sentences, supra note 141, at 2.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170 (a) (2); 1170.1a (c) (West Supp. 1977).
156. SB 42 Sentences, supra note 141, at 1. See also Senate Transcript,
supra note 47, at 49; L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1976, pt. II, at 6, col. 1 (J. Anthony
Kline, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.'s legal adviser, said that "sentences
for most crimes [under Senate Bill 42] would remain much the same
1199
Comments[VOL. 14: 1176, 1977]
Sentences under the prior law, although appearing to be longer,
were in reality almost always shorter than the statutory maxi-
mum. 157 The median time served by prisoners is a more accurate
indicator of the actual time served under the prior law. Because
Senate Bill 42 terms do not appear to differ from prior median sen-
tences actually served, the new statute does not promote shorter
sentences for California offenders.
THE EFFECTS OF SENATE BILL 42
Effect on the Public
Some critics of these arguments may contend that the use of
medians is misleading. On the one hand, the five percent of the in-
mates who would have served their maximum indeterminate sen-
tence under prior law' 5 8 must be released within a certain time
under the definite sentence law. 5 9 This type of criminal receives a
windfall-possibly to the detriment of the public because this "hard-
core" criminal is now free. On the other hand, the "ideal offender"
who would have served a term shorter than the prior median sen-
tence will now serve a greater term under the new law, because
Senate Bill 42's base sentences are equal to prior medians. 10 0 Hence,
the critics maintain that the new law will unjustly shorten some
sentences, and unfairly lengthen others.
However, both contentions are inaccurate. First, "the [hardcore
inmates] will not even be affected by SB 42, insofar as SB 42 does
not set determinate sentences for those convicted of such crimes as
capital offenses or kidnapping for robbery or ransom."''6
Second, even without the enactment of Senate Bill 42, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that an individual's term must be
fixed proportionately to his individual culpability.10 2 Although an
.... "); L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1975, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1 (the Adult Authority
terms discussed at note 139 supra were "based upon actual time served by
felons who have been paroled in the last five years"). Cf. Sacramento Bee,
Sept. 12, 1976, pt. A, at 13, col. 1 (Mike Salerno, co-drafter of Senate Bill
42, said that "[n]onviolent offenders will serve less time .... [and] [v]io-
lent offenders will serve more. The total number of man-hours served will
probably stay the same.") (articles on file with the San Diego Law Review).
157. See note 142 supra.
158. See Note, supra note 142, at 1364.
159. With the exception of certain crimes discussed at notes 69-71 supra,
nearly all criminal violations under the new law will have fixed, definite
sentences.
160. See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
161. Letter from Senator John A. Nejedly to All Interested Persons Re-
garding Retroactivity Provisions of Senate Bill 42, Sept. 2, 1976, at 1 (on
file with the San Diego Law Review).
162. See text accompanying notes 93-122 supra.
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individual may constitute some risk to society, his term may not
be so long as to constitute cruel or unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the California Constitution. 63 Thus, even if the "danger-
ous" criminal could be readily defined and identified,6 4 such an
individual cannot be indeterminately incarcerated merely for his
possible risk to society. 6 5 He must have committed some viola-
tion of the law which merits the extent and magnitude of the
sentence he receives.
Third, the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act increases sen-
tences for women offenders by bringing them into parity with those
imposed on men. A comparison of the median time served by men
and women under the old law, with comparative sentences under
the new law,166 reveals that women will serve longer sentences
under the new Act.
167
163. Although the defendant in Rodriguez constituted some risk to soci-
ety, in his 22 years of imprisonment he had committed no violent act. Even
though he has since been returned to prison on a charge of child molesting,
"as the court read the psychiatric reports there was no support for a conclu-
sion that at the time of the offense petitioner's character was such that when
considered with the facts of his particular offense, life imprisonment was
justified." Proportionate Sentencing, supra note 102, at 554 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
164. See Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 44, at 33.
165. See note 163 supra.
166.
Median Time Served by Felons Paroled for Senate Bill
Offense First Time 1974-1975t 42 Terms
(in months)
Women Men
Manslaughter 27 48 36 (unenhanced)
Burglary 2 18 29 24 (unenhanced)
Grand Theft except auto 20.5 30 24 (unenhanced)
Forgery and Checks 19 26.5 24 (unenhanced)
CSS I & 11* 31 40.5 36 (unenhanced)
CSS III, IV, & V** 25 37 36 (unenhanced)
* Controlled Substances Schedules, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
11054-11055 (West 1975).
** Id. §§ 11056-11058.
t State of California, Health & Welfare Agency, Dep't of Corrections.
(statistics on file with the San Diego Law Review).
167. The new sentences should be in accord with the equal protection
clause. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 14, at 326-28; Comment, Sex Dis-
crimination-Disparate Sentencing of Male and Female Offenders Violates
Equal Protection-State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973), 8
SUFFOLx L. Ruv. 830 (1974).
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In addition, the contention that the good offender will serve
an unjustly longer sentence than under the prior law is unfounded.
Under the new law, the trial court must choose the middle of the
three provided terms unless "there are circumstances in. . . mitiga-
tion of the crime." 6" The "good offender" will not serve any more
time under the new law because the court may, upon motion, 6 9
choose the lower of the three provided terms if circumstances war-
rant such a decision. 1 7 0 Moreover, Senate Bill 42 will not affect
the probation process, 17 which keeps the offender who should not
serve a prison sentence from being incarcerated.
Finally, the new law will benefit the public by reducing the flood
of habeas corpus petitions which preceded the enactment of Senate
Bill 42. A deluge of petitions had begun to inundate the courts
after the Rodriguez decision,172 each demanding-often without
merit173-that the appellate court review the proportionality of the
individual's sentence. Since appellate courts will no longer evaluate
definite sentences in reference to proportionality,'7 4 the large inflow
of petitions should cease.
Effect on the Prison Inmates
The women's prison will necessarily become more crowded
because women will be serving longer prison sentences. 75 There-
fore, new prison facilities should be authorized by the legislature in
response to this effect. However, should the Community Release
Board choose to give liberal good-time to all or most offenders-
an action which is unlikely 7 6-- the base terms for women under
168. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1977).
169. Under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1977), a motion must
be made prior to or at the time of sentencing. The circumstances in mitiga-
tion must be set forth within the motion, and must be found true by the
trial court upon the evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion
and/or previously heard by the judge at the trial. The factual findings and
reasons in support of the motion must then be set forth on the record
at the time of sentencing.
170. Id.
171. Oppenheim, supra note 61, at 654 & n.15.
172. Over 40,000 petitions for examination of alleged improportionality
"suddenly" hit the appellate courts after the Rodriguez decision. In re Wil-
liams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 10, 17-19, 125 Cal. Rptr. 457, 462-63 (1975).
173. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 654 n.18, 537 P.2d 384, 395 n.18, 122
Cal. Rptr. 552, 563 n.18 (1975).
174. This statement is not to imply that if a term set by the legislature
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the California Con-
stitution the courts would be powerless to act. The contention here is that
the Rodriguez test of proportionality will no longer be employed to ascer-
tain individual sentences under Senate Bill 42.
175. S. RUBi, supra note 8, at 164.
176. The good-time provisions under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2930-2932
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Senate Bill 42 would begin to approach prior medians. This action
would forestall some potential overcrowding.
From the prisoner's perspective, the most important aspect of the
new act is the alleviation of the anxiety caused by the indeter-
minate sentence. 177 According to one survey, prisoners disliked the
indeterminate sentence more than bad food, dangerous living condi-
tions, or incompetent medical treatment. 78 The arbitrary, subjec-
tive, and meaningless sentence review sessions will no longer loom
over the head of the prisoner.179 Furthermore, because the inde-
terminate sentence was a major factor of prison unrest and




The Wingo-Rodriguez decisions compelled the Adult Authority to
set primary terms. 8 2 These release dates were based on prior
median time served under the old law.8 3 A comparison of these
prior medians with the Senate Bill 42 terms plus potential enhance-
ments reveals no discrepancy. 8 4 Thus, the new Act does not de-
crease the length of terms which felons will now be required to
serve. Even assuming that certain individuals' terms may be some-
what shorter, Senate Bill 42 terms are nearly identical to the Adult
Authority release dates used over a year before the new law was
enacted. The primary purpose of Senate Bill 42 definite terms-
(West Supp. 1977) are fixed at a one-third sentence reduction. Thus, un-
less the Community Release Board were to give nearly everyone maximum
good-time credits, notwithstanding their behavior, the higher terms under
Senate Bill 42 would still be above prior medians. However, since the use
of good-time credits may decrease prison violence, it is doubtful that the
Community Release Board would give unearned good time credits to all
women offenders because there would then be little incentive to refrain
from assaultive behavior while in prison.
177. In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 654 n.18, 537 P.2d 384, 395 n.18, 122
Cal. Rptr. 552, 563 n.18 (1975); J. MITFORD, supra note 27, at 86-87; Flat
Time, supra note 55, at 626. See also note 57 supra.
178. J. MrTFrro, supra note 27, at 86-87.
179. See note 37 supra.
180. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
181. Id. See also note 60 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 99-122 supra.
183. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 123-56 supra.
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to punish the offender-is therefore met by a system of penal laws
which has not diminished the severity of punishment by reducing
the length of incarceration.
Although terms for women will be longer, unjustly longer terms
for good offenders-whether male or female-will not result. Sen-
ate Bill 42 should provide a greater measure of fairness to the
criminal justice system,185 because all offenders will be treated in
a like manner. 8 6
The Indeterminate Sentence Law was a fraud. Although it was
based on the false promise of rehabilitation of criminals, it often
led to great anxiety among prisoners. The abolition of indeter-
minate sentencing should reduce prison unrest and prisoner frustra-
tion associated with the arbitrariness of the indeterminate sen-
tence.
8 7
Additionally, the new law should have the same general effect
on deterring crime as did the indeterminate sentence.18 8 Because
the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the individual's cul-
pability, it is doubtful that the prior indeterminate sentence law
had any greater effect in protecting society from the dangerous
offender than will the present law. 8 9
The new law is honest. It announces that the purpose of prison
is to punish the offender. It makes no promise of rehabilitation.
Yet, the new law may accomplish what the old law failed to do-
releasing a convict back into society who, although not rehabilitated,
is not eternally bitter with the society that incarcerated him.
AFTERWORD
As this Comment goes to press, the legislature has enacted As-
sembly Bill 476, which amends various portions of Senate Bill 42.
However, the main thrust of this Comment-that Senate Bill 42 does
not shorten sentences-remains viable regardless of the passage of
Assembly Bill 476.
KENNETH R. ZUETEL, JR.
185. Oppenheim, supra note 61, at 659.
186. Flat Time, supra note 55, at 626.
187. See note 60 supra.
188. See notes 48, 49 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 99-122 supra.
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